| Docket No. | Op. Below | Argument | Opinion | Author | Term |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 250302 | - - | - - | April 23, 2026 | - - | 2026 |
Holding
Because the plain language of Code § 18.2-369(C) unambiguously applies to the impairment of the victim in this case, it is unnecessary to resort to canons of statutory construction, including the rule of lenity. Thus, the trial court’s interpretation of Code § 18.2-369(C) was correct here, and its judgment was not plainly wrong, and accordingly the Court of Appeals did not err by affirming it. This holding is a narrow one: the Court does not conclude that impairment by reason of temporary intoxication per se renders an adult “vulnerable” within the meaning of Code § 18.2-369(C), but holds only that the evidence in this particular case was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude that the magnitude of the victim’s condition rendered her a “vulnerable adult” under the plain language of Code § 18.2-369(C). The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
